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culpability has been made."' Jones, 947 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Cabana,
474 U.S. at 387).
The requisite (or specific) finding in the instant case, the court
wrote, is found in Va. Code Ann. §17-1 10.1(C)(2): "whether the sen-
tence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Because
the Virginia Supreme Court found no disproportionality in its automatic
review ofJones' sentence, the Fourth Circuit held, based on Cabana, that
this review met the specific finding and proper application of an aggra-
vating factor authorizing the imposition of capital punishment.
However, the Cabana ruling that a requisite finding could be
made by an appellate court (if not made by a jury) was limited to the
specific finding of the defendant's degree of culpability. In Cabana, the
Supreme Court held that "the factual determination of whether the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill" could be specifi-
cally made by an appellate court. 474 U.S. at 390. A specific finding as
to the defendant's degree of culpability was required by Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), in which the Court held that, without the
requisite finding of culpability, imposition of the death penalty would be
disproportionate. Cabana did not authorize the curing of constitutional
infirmities in aggravating circumstances via an appellate court's general
finding of proportionality.
In Jones, the Fourth Circuit finally acknowledged that the states
must provide a narrowing construction for their aggravating factors
pursuant to Godfiey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). In Godfrey, the
United States Supreme Court held that Georgia's application of its
vileness aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague because "there
is nothing in these few words, standing alone that implied any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence."
Id. at 429. The constitutionality of the application of the vileness
aggravating factor was again tested in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356 (1988). The Court in Maynard held that state supreme courts must
monitor the use of any vague aggravating factors that the states use in
sentencing a defendant to death.
The court approved Virginia's application to the facts of Jones'
case the limiting constructions of "aggravated battery" - "a battery
which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the mini-
mum necessary to accomplish an act of murder," Smith v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978)- and "depravity
of mind" - "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. at 478,248 S.E.2d at
149.
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has not
yet approved Virginia's narrowing construction of its statutory vileness
factor. In Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990), however, the Court
held that the limiting construction of Mississippi's vileness factor was
not constitutionally sufficient. See also case summary of Shell v. Missis-
sippi, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1991). Mississippi's
limiting construction is similar to Virginia's.
Since the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality
of Virginia's narrowing construction, defense counsel should file a
motion for a bill of particulars asking the Commonwealth to state upon
which of the three vileness factor components the prosecution will rely
in seeking the death penalty. In addition, defense counsel should request,
pre-trial, disclosure of all "narrowing constructions" that the Common-
wealth intends to use at the sentencing phase. Virginia's construction of
"depravity of mind," defense counsel should note, is particularly suspect
after Shell v. Mississippi. Defense counsel will, through pre-trial
litigation, preserve constitutional challenges to the Commonwealth's
narrowing construction of its vileness factor at trial. In order to insure
absolutely the preservation of this issue, objection should also be made
at the penalty trial to the jury verdict form (see Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4 (D)) and the model penalty trial jury instruction (see Va. Model
Jury Instruction No. 34.120).
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles
ROGERS v. COMMONWEALTH
242 Va. 307,410 S.E.2d 621 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
The Circuit Court of Allegheny County, Virginia convicted Rocky
Dale Rogers of three felonies (robbery, burglary and rape) and capital
murder in November 1990. The capital murder conviction was based on
"the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of the victim while in the
commission of robbery when armed with a deadly weapon, or while in the
commission of, or subsequent to, rape" pursuant to Virginia Code Section
18.2-31 (4)(5).
The victim, a 74-year-old-widow, was in her home in Covington
when Rogers forced his way inside. According to the defendant's own
statement and the Commonwealth's theory, at least one other individual,
Troy Malcolm, accompanied the defendant. They entered the house
planning to rob the woman. Ultimately, she was severely beaten about the
head, face and neck with fists and a glass candlestick holder, stripped nude
and raped. At some point she was stabbed a number of times in the chest
and back, causing wounds which killed her.
The defendant changed his story during the course of several
interrogations, admitted rape, but throughout maintained that he did not
stab the victim. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307,316,410 S.E.2d
621, 626 (1991). At trial, the Commonwealth's position was that the
defendant was "'the last man in the house,' tacitly conceding that at least
one other person was present at some time" during the criminal enter-
prise. Rogers, 242 Va. at 318, 410 S.E.2d at 628. The detective who
interrogated Rogers also represented to him that Malcolm had acknowl-
edged being in the house. Rogers, 242 Va. at 316,410 S.E.2d at 626. The
Commonwealth presented no forensic evidence linking Rogers to the
killing.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the noncapital convictions,
which the defendant did not appeal. On appeal of the capital murder
conviction, however, the court chose to address the single issue of
"whether the evidence [was] legally sufficient to establish that the
defendant was the actual perpetrator of the crime," and reversed. Rogers,
242 Va. at 310, 410 S.E.2d at 623.
The court held that, as to capital murder, the prosecution failed to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence in that
the Commonwealth failed to exclude Malcolm as the perpetrator of the
killing. In other words, "the Commonwealth's evidence failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Rogers was the so-called
'triggerman' [in] thathe wielded the knife." Rogers, 242 Va. at 319, 621
S.E.2d at 628. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case for trial on an offense no greater than murder in the first degree.
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ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Under the Virginia "triggerman rule," when the offenses consti-
tuting the charge of capital murder are the willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of a person in the commission of robbery armed with
a deadly weapon, or while in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape,
a defendant may not be convicted of capital murder unless the Common-
wealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the
actual perpetrator of the murder. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
146, 149, 255 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1979), cert. denied 454 U.S. 920 (1981).
Contrary to normal rules of accomplice liability, neither an accessory
before the fact nor a principal in the second degree may be so convicted.
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599 (1990).
In Cheng, three individuals participated in the robbery and fatal
shooting of the victim. The evidence did not suggest, however, that more
than one person shot the victim. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's conviction of Cheng for capital murderbecause it held that the jury
could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Cheng was the
triggerman.
Like Cheng, Rogers was admittedly a participant in the incident,
but as the court points out, "[t]he significant weakness in the
Commonwealth's case is the lack of any evidence, direct or circumstan-
tial, which places the murder weapon in defendant's hands." Rogers, 242
Va. at 319, 410 S.E.2d at 628. Accordingly, the jury could not have
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Rogers was the triggerman.
While a defendant may be found to be the triggerman based
entirely upon circumstantial evidence, such circumstantial evidence
only may be used "provided it is of such convincing character as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is guilty.
Dukes v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 313 S.E.2d 382 (1984). Thus,
"[sluspicion of guilt, however strong, or even a probability of guilt, is
insufficient to support a conviction." Cheng, 240 Va. at 42, 393 S.E.2d
at 608.
In the instant case, the court acknowledged that there is indeed, a
"probability that the defendant was the criminal agent in the victim's
death." Rogers, 242 Va. at 320, 410 S.E.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
However, "all necessary circumstances must be consistent with guilt, must
be inconsistent with innocence, and must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence. [...] Because the circumstances of defendant's
conduct do not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Troy Malcolm
killed the victim, the capital murder prosecution fails." Id.
Where the evidence suggests the possibility ofjoint perpetration of
acts causing death, the Virginia Supreme Court has departed from a strict
interpretation of the triggerman rule. In Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241
Va. 482,404 S.E.2d 227 (1991), and in Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220
Va. 243,257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), the
court upheld capital murder convictions based upon theories of joint
participation. In Coppola, the co-defendants each repeatedly assaulted the
victim, causing her death. In Strickler, the co-defendants killed the victim
by crushing her skull with a sixty-nine pound rock. Partly because of the
very specific circumstances which made it feasible to believe that two
people would have been needed to hold the victim and drop the rock, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that it was immaterial whether Strickler held
the victim down or pummeled her with the rock because the evidence
showed that the victim's death was caused by one indivisible act perpe-
trated by two individuals. See case summary of Strickler v. Common-
wealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.2 2 (1991).
Cheng, Strickler, and Rogers indicate that except in murder forhire
cases, where the evidence does not suggest joint participation in acts
causing death, both co-defendants may not be convicted of capital murder.
In cases where the evidence is arguably less than prima facie that a
particular defendant caused death, the issue may be raised pretrial by a
motion to dismiss the capital indictment. If the issue is determined to be
a jury question, care should be taken to preserve it clearly on the record.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Mclnemey
GEORGE v. COMMONWEALTH
242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Michael Carl George was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-31(4). Upon a finding of "future dangerousness" and
"vileness," the jury set George's penalty at death, which was accepted by
the trial court.
On June 16, 1990 at approximately 2:00 p.m., fifteen-year-old
Alexander Eugene Sztanko was last seen alive by his parents when he rode
his motorcycle away from his family's house to nearby woods. Approxi-
mately one hour to half an hour later, Alex's father heard two gunshots
which originated from the woods. The next day, Corporal Joseph Dillon
of the Prince William County Police Department noticed a blue Ford
Bronco in the woods near Alex's house. Aware that Alex had been
reported missing and that he had seen the same vehicle at the same location
the day before, Corporal Dillon ran a license check of the Bronco and found
that it was registered to George. Shortly thereafter, Corporal Dillon
observed a camouflaged person who "appear[ed] ... that he did not want
to be seen." George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 269 (1991). This
person identified himself as George and stated that he was in the area to find
a hunting ground. In a conversation with Dillon, George admitted that he
had been in the same area the day before. Once another police unit arrived,
officer Dillon arrested George for trespassing.
Once George was in custody and transferred away, "Dillon
walked to the spot where George had knelt down." Id. at 269. There,
officer Dillon found Alex's tennis shoes. After a more thorough search
of the area, the police discovered Alex's shoeless body. The police also
recovered Alex's motorcycle and helmet and determined that they were
found approximately five-tenths of mile from where the body had lain.
Alex died instantaneously of a single gunshot wound to the head.
In addition, the autopsy revealed abrasions of Alex's penis which were
consistent with an "electrical burning." Id. at 269-270. The autopsy also
revealed "the presence of seminal fluid." Id. at 270. "Fibers found on
Alex's T-shirt were consistent with the material from ... George's
camouflage jacket." Id. An examination of George's clothing revealed
blood "inconsistent with his blood type but consistent with Alex's." Id.
Police searches of George, his vehicle, and his parents' home led
to the discovery of a topographical map marking where the victim's body
and motorcycle plus helmet were found, a stun gun, and a fully loaded
nine millimeter pistol determined to be the murder weapon.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court upheld George's conviction of
capital murder in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly
weapon, and affirmed his sentence at death. George assigned numerous
